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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
REX HOLLAND,
REX HOLLAND. Adn1inistrator 'vith
the Will Annexed of the Estate of
John G. Holland, Deceased,
Plaintiffs and Appellants)

-vs.Civil No. 87 40

ARTIIUR E. 1\IORETON, ETHEL
T. 1IORETON, also knovvn as E. T.
niORETON, JOHN R. MORETON,
also known as J. R. MORETON,
ROSE ANN MORETON, SUSAN
~IORETON TEVIS,
Defendants and Respondents.

1

I

PETITION FOR REHEARING

TO TI-IE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF THE S1~I)REME COURT OF THE STATE
OF lTTAH:
The respondents, and each of them, respectfully
petition this Court for a rehearing on its opinion filed
in the above entitled cause on July 8, 1960. The grounds
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for this petition and the points 'vherein the respondents
allege that this Court has erred are as follo,vs :
1. The holding of the C~ourt is contrary to the First
Cause of ..._~ction of plaintiffs' con1plaint, ,\~hich cause the
plaintiffs elected to sub1nit to the jur:~ in lieu of their
Seeond Cause of . .~ction, the Second Cause of . A.ction being consistent "'"ith the opinion of the Court, but upon
'''"hich there has been no trial and one is not. by the direction of this Court, contemplated.

:2. By holding that the appellants 'vere not entitled
to prevail upon the cause of action and theory upon which
the action \Vas tried to the trial jury, and then to re1nand
the action 'vith instructions to enter a judgment upon
a ne'v and different cause of action and theory~ deprives
the respondent of a jury trial and of property ":ithout
due process of law and is contrary to Sections 7 and 10
of Article I and Section 9 of Article \TIII of the Constitlttvon of the State of Utah and to Rule 39(a), [~tah R-ules
of C1"vN Procedure.
3. The holding that appellants are entitled to a
stated a1nount by "'ay of punitive da1nages is arbitrary
and deprives respondent of a jury trial and of his property without due process of la,Y, and is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court and contrary to the constitutional
provisions and to the rule referred to above . particularly
in light of the holding that the theory and eause of action
upon which the cause was submitted to the jury is erroneous. To be consistent, impartial and "-i.thin the concept
of due process, an a'vard of punitive da1nages, if any

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
there n1ight be, should be left to the trier of the fact upon
consideration of a eause \vhich recognizes the vested interest of the respondent in and to one-fourth of the purchase price, \vhich the opinion recognizes but \Vhich the
jury in the instant action "\\·as not pern1itted to consider.
4. The opinion gives the false impression that the
statute of li1nitations (Subsection 3, Section 78-12-26,
L~ tah Code Annotated 1953) \Vas passed upon and deterInined by the jury. In fact the jury \\·as not instructed
nor did it pass upon the statute of lilnitations.
5. The opinion restriets the statute of liu1itations
(Subsection 3, Section 78-12-28, U lah Code L-1 nnotated
1953) to actual notice on the part of Holland of the alleged fraud, the opinion stating: "If the jury had accepted the defendant's contention that the Hollands kueu·
the facts * * * the action \Vould have been barred by the
time it was brought.'' The opinion, in dealing \vith the
kno\vledge of the Hollands, excludes facts to support the
contention and the ruling of the trial court to the effect
that the Hollands \vere put on inquiry ;-;ufficient to charge
the1n \Yith kno\vledge more than three years before the
action was commenced.
6. The opinion does not rationalize or discuss the
running of the statute of limitations in this action as a
question of law passed upon by the trial court in support
of its ruling setting aside the verdict of the jury. The
Court ignores Rex Holland's own "·ritings of September
14, 1948, and October 13, 1948, and the telegram fro1n
~Ir. Moreton of October 8, 1948. The concurring opinion
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in the appeal fro1n the surnmary judgment in favor of
Columbia Iron Mining Company imputes to Rex Holland
knowledge of the total purchase price as of September
14, 1948. This is ignored in the instant opinion.
7. The opinion places unjustified emphasis on the
hearsay conversation with Canfield and on the self-serving statements by Rex Holland, "\vhich 1vere inadmissible
as evidence.
8.

The opinion is contrary to law and to the facts.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTE~SEN
HARLEY \\T. GlTSTIX
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents

CERTIFIC.._.\.TE
The attorneys for the petitioning respondents hereby
certify that this petition for rehearing is made in good
faith .and not for the purpose of delay.
E. R. CHRISTENSEN
HARLEY W. GUSTIN
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ARGU~1ENT

The various points specified above are grouped for
argument under the follo\\'"ing designations:
POINT ONE
'THE MANDATE TO CORRECT AND REINSTATE THE
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF REX HOLLAND IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE AS SUBMITTED
TO 'THE JURY WAS ERROR.

The opinion expressly states :
"The case was submitted on the theory that
if the jury believed that Moreton breached his
fiduciary duty and practiced a fraud upon the
plaintiffs, he \vas to receive none of the purchase
price; and that it \vould be divided bet-vveen the
Hollands and Murie, one-third to each. The jury
found for Rex Holland on this theory and awarded
hirn one-third of the $287,500 Moreton ohtained,
or $95,833. We think this is error." (Emphasis
added).
After the decision of this ·Court in IIolland v. Coh~mbia Iron ~~fining Co., ~ lTtah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d 700,
there remained but two causes of action. The plaintiffs
were then limited to the First and Second Causes of
Action as contained in their amended complaint. Paragraph numbered 2 of the Pretrial Order of October 22,
1956, so provides (R. 148-150).
The distinction between the two causes 1s clearly
defined in the record.
"THE COURT (Judge I-Ianson): * * ~· Tl1e
first and second causes of action are the only onp~
involved in this suit~~
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::\IR. ROBERTS: That is right. The first
cause is on the theorY there 'vas a breach of the
confidential relation~hip existing between Mr.
::\Ioreton and the I-Iollands and because of that
they are entitled to everything, or that Mr. Moreton is entitled to nothing, and ''"'e, in that cause,
ask for judgment for the entire amount, 'vhich
'vould 1nean TJIE COURT: He forfeits his $287,000.00.

l\fR. ROBERTS: Of course (,,~e) "~ould only be
entitled to t'vo-thirds of the $387,500.00 under
that. ·vFe 'vould be entitled to t'Yo-thirds less $66,000.00 ''Thich 've have already received.

.

The second cause is on the theory that each
of these persons should have recei\ed a one-fourth
jnterest in this entire thing. ~Ir. ~Ioreton, along
'vith them, is entitled to his one-fourth, which
1neans Rex's share 'vould be entitled to one-fourth
-$33,333.00 he has already received - and then,
of course, John Holland's share being sued for by
Rex as administrator.'' (R. 201-202)

"niR. G1JSTIN: Isn't there an oYerlapping in the
first and seeond '?
~fR..

ROBERTS: There are t'vo different theories. \\Te couldn't reeover both these sums. That
is on the theory that :Jir. :Jforeton forfeits any
co1npensation he reeeived. If 've are not right on
that, there should be no forfeiture, then 've ask
for our quarter interest.~~ (R. :202-203).

''THE COURT: So the reeord is clear, as I understand it, the first cause of action is now the only
n1atter that is to be submitted to the jury, and
the runount of punitive dan1ages, if any, is to be
lin1ited to the extent of $50,000.00, is that rightt
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~fR. ROBER~rS

: That is right.

jlR. GlTSrr_rx: The first cause of action·;
~rfiE

C0l1 RT: Be li1nited entirel,\~ to the first
cause of action." (R. 960-961).

The jnr:· by the last paragraph of
(R. 267), was instructed:

I11~truetion

X o. 6

·•In the event said defendant ~Ioreton fails to
persuade you by a preponderance of the evidence
that he made the above described disclosure to
Holland or that he knew or could have known
frorn con'l:ersat,ions tvith Ill ore ton and yon further
find fro1n a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant 1foreton 's failure to make the above
described disclosure \\·as y,Tilful and deliberate
then you should return a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant 1\Ioreton for one-third
of the amount of 1noney paid by Columbia Iron
:Jiining Company to the defendant Moreton. That
figure is the sum of $95,833.00." (R. 267). (Emphasis added).
The 1nandate in the instant action orders the correction of the judg1nent in favor of Rex 1-Iolland, not on
the theory of the action as submitted to the jury in the
court belo\\~, but on the theory of the Second Cause of
Action, upon which there has been no trial. Instruction
No. 6 persists "as the law of the case'' not\\·ithstanding
the so-called correction of the judgrnent. The situation
thus resulting is an irreconcilable one. ·The Court holds
that error was committed in permitting the jur.v to find
on the forfeiture theory, the theory upon vvhich the action
"\Vas submitted. The jury had no alternative other than
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to decide the case on the theory of forfeiture or to render
a verdict of no cause of action. This Court is bound by
the "la\v of the case" just as \vas the jury. Instruction
No. 6 inhibits this Court as it did the jury. Petting~ll v.
Perkins (1954), 2 t'"tah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185, states:
"Plaintiff asked that the case be tried on
that theory, that the jury be so instructed, and
that the jury find their verdict on that basis, and
the law as so declared. Right or wrong, the instructions became the la\v of the case, were binding upon the jury, on the court and counsel"
The appeal of Rex Holland is taken fron1 the judgnlent which sets aside the verdict and dismisses the action
in accordance \vith the motion for directed verdict (R.
304). The present holding of the Court is to the effect
that it was error to have submitted the case to the jury
on the forfeiture theory as delineated by the First Cause
of Action and by Instruction X o. 6. In so holding, this
Court recognizes the propriety of the trial court's action
in setting aside the Yerdict of the jury and it then necessarily and logically follo\YS that the judg1nent appealed
fro1n should be affir1ned. Under the present state of the
record a ne\v trial is the only affirn1atiYe relief that the
Court can grant appellants.
The Inandate is a c.lear departure fron1 Instruction
No. 6. In Davis 'l'. ltlidcale City (1920), 56 l:tah 1, 189
P. 7+, this Court held that unassailed instructions are
binding upon this Court as \Yell as the court belo\\- and
the parties litigant. In that case it \vas said:
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"As stated by appellant, these instructions
beca1ne the lavv of the case. It is not incumbent
upon this court to determine their validity· or invalidity or vvhether the court erred in giving then1
or not. For the purpose of this case they are
binding upon this court as vvell as the court belovv
and the parties litigant."
In Sierra N ecada Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co.
(1916), 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943, tllis Court said :
"If, on a revievv of the proceedings resulting
in the judgment, error should be found to plaintiff's prejudice, still we would not be authorized to
enhance the judgment; vve would only reverse
it and grant a new trial. This is so because vve are
not authorized, in a lavv case, to try the issues on
the record and make, or direct, findings, or treat
as found that which ought to have been found."
Cases fron1 other jurisdictions are equally decisive:
Gogg·ins v. Herndon (Idaho 1952), 249 P. 2d 203,
holds:

"We must decide the case in accordance with
the theory of its presentation in the trial court."

Shumate v. Johnson Puhlishing Company (CaL
1956), 293 P .2d 531, holds :
"The theory on which the case was tried in the
court below must be followed on review.''
Cleary
543, holds:

~c.

Inrliruza Beach, Inc. (C:C.A. 7), 275 F.2d

"Since plaintiff did not submit the case for
trial on a wilful and wanton theory, he 1nay not
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no'v rely, in this court, on a ":ilful and 'vanton
theory for reversal of the judgment."
U ni:ted States t·. Waechter et al., ( C.C.A. 9, 1952),
195 F .2d 963, holds :

"We agree that the govern1nent, 'Yhatever
1nay he the strength of its present argun1ent, cannot fairly urge as a ground for reversal a theory
\vhich j t did not present ''Thile the case 'vas before
the trial court.''
Russell v. Sunb1trst Ref£ning Co.
P. 998, holds :

(~Iont.

1928L 272

"The Supre1ne Court 'vill revie'v a case upon
the theory upon 'Yhich it was tried in the district
court (Smith v. Barnes, 51 :Jiont. 202, 149 P. 963,
Ann. Cas. 1917D, 330), and in determining "'hat
that theory 'vas resort n1ay be had to the instructions "Thich the court 'Yas requested to give.

* * *
It is therefore apparent that the plaintiff's
theory on the trial of the case \Yas that, in order
to prevail, he n1ust by the evidence which he introduced bring hin1self within one of the conditions
nan1ed in this instruction~ and that, if he did not
do so, the verdict of the jury must necessarily go
for the defendant.''
The holding of this Court to the effect that the jury
could not return a verdict on the theory of forfeiture is
in accord \Yith the ruling of the trial court setting aside
the jury verdict and entering judgn1ent in aceordance 'vith
the motion for a directed verdict. This Court sustains
the action of the trial court and yet, contrary to all precedent, re,vrites the verdict, then directs the entry of the
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verdict as re\vritten, not considering it to be bound by the
la\V of the case.
Having determined that Rex Holland cannot prevail
upon the theory submitted to the jury as reflected by Instruction 6, the Court can only affirm the decision of the
trial court. This Court, as stated in Sierra Nevada Mill
Co. v. J(evth O'Brieu, supra, is not authorized to try the
issues on the record and make or direct findings or treat
as found that which ought to have been found.
In 3 Ant. Jur., Appeal and Error, Section 1218, page
720, it is said:
"Generally, it may be said that \vhen it appears that the plaintiff can probably make a
better showing on his trial, the court, upon reversing the judgment, should re1nand it for a
ne\v trial. But the court is required to re1nand
for a new trial only when a nevv trial is necessary. That condi:tion, however, is always deemed
to exist, as to a jury case, when, ~tnder any circumstances, a new trial mi.ght res1tlt otherwise
than in s~tch a j~tdgment bet"vn,rJ awarded as W'Otttld
have been rendered before had the error or
errors not been committed.'' (Emphasis added.)
The trial court did not set aside the jury· verdict
on the statute of lin1itations alone. Its ruling \Vas sufficiently comprehensive to include the holding of this
Court that Rex Holland could not prevail upon his theory
of forfeiture. That being the s_tate of the record there
can be no reversal. Furthermore, the plaintiff elected
to submit the action on the theory now determined to
be untenable and he should not now be entitled to prevail
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short of a new trial upon the theory of his Second
Cause of Action, \vhich theory he elected not to pursue
at the trial level.
POINT II.
THE OPINION IS CONTRARY TO THE ENUMERAT'ED
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.

The effect of the opinion is to direct the entry of
a judgment upon plaintiffs' Second Cause of ..._t\_ction in
favor of Rex Holland. In so doing the Court ignores
the fundamental right of trial by jury and compounds
the basic error, if such can be done, by arbitrarily assessing an award of $25,000.00 as punitive damages as
if the case had been tried and presented to the trier
of the fact on the theory that ~Ir. nioreton had a vested
interest.
The op1n1on recognizes that !fr. !foreton became
vested with ownership of a one-fourth interest in the
1nining claims. "He is therefore entitled to his fair
proportion of the price for ,,~hich they \Yere sold." Under
this connotation the Court presumes to say that the
jury, if the action had been tried on that theory~ would
have a\Yarded $25,000.00 by \Yay of punitive damages.
The award that the jury n1ade \Yas based upon the
theory that l\[r. !Ioreton had no interest in the claims
or any interest in the purchase price. On that theory,
and justifiably so, the Court holds the verdict to have
been erroneous. By the srune token it should be said
that the jury's concept of punitive dan1age

"~as

in error.
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Had the jury been instructed on the theory that
nlr. 1Ioreton did in fact obtain the patents to the claims
as he agreed, and therefore under the agreement of
ownership becan1e vested with an interest in the clain1s
and in the purchase price, the jury's view of the punitive side of the action could well have been different.
The incredible silence of Rex Holland after his letter
to Dr. Mathesius "\vherein he stated that he "\vas advised
of 25¢ per ton being the prevailing price, his kno,vledge
of the estimated tonnage at 1.55 million tons and after
the telegram fro1n I\1r. I\:foreton to be hereafter referred
to, and in which telegram Mr. Moreton stated that he
'vas bargaining for as much as he could get for his
O\Yn interest in addition to the fixed amount for the
Holland interest, could be argued as showing bad faith
on Rex Holland's part and good faith on the part of
~Ir. 1Ioreton. Rex Holland remained silent at the closing
of the transaction after he had been alerted to the
fact that :11r. Moreton "ras actually receiving more
than an equal fourth of the transaction. Rex Holland's
silence could be said to have been a trap to enable
hi1n to thereafter change his position, once having secured his portion of the $100,000.00 for which he had
bargained.
These observations are not intended to persuade
this Court on the merits of the controversy as the problem is inherently one for the trier of the fact. It is
the prerogative of the trier of the fact under appropriate instructions, if by a jury, to determine good faith
or the want of it and the propriety or i1npropriety under
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all of the circu1nstances gojng to the a\vard of punitive
da1nages. The appellate court on appeal is limited to
"questions of la\v alone.'' Section 9, .L~rticle VIII, Co·nstitution of the State of Utah.
Had the jury been instructed that in determining
co1npensatory damage it should include interest at the
rate of G% per annum fro1n the 20th day of December,
1948, and that the a\\~ard of punitive da1nages should
not he disproportionate to the actual damage sustained
or should bear son1e relation to the injury complained
of and the cause thereof, as held in Falkenberg v. A"Teff
(1928), 72 Utah 258, 169 P. 1008, its concept of the
a "Tard of $25,000.00 might have been different.
This Court, in changing the theory upon which
I-Iolland 1night recover and stating a ne\Y pre1nise of
actual drunage, adhering nevertheless to the former
a\vard of punitive da1nages, deprives respondent fron1
a jury determination of the relationship between the
punitive dan1age and the actual damage, an important
facet that the jury alone has the right to determine.
Further1nore, the ·Court in reducing the an1ount of the
actual da1nage has, in effect, increased proportionately
the an1ount of the punitive damage. ''llile this Court
has, in some instances, reduced the runount of punitive
dan1age as being disproportionate to the actual damage,
we kno'v of no case "~here the Court has increased the
a1nount of punitive damage.
Correcting the judgment to add interest at 6%
from Dece1nber 1948 to the date of the verdict in July
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1957 adds almost 50% of the principal sum of $63,542.00
to the verdict. Under proper instructions the jury 'vould
have been permitted to \veigh the circtunstance of approximately $30,000.00 in interest in its consideration
of a punitive award, if any.

In Ostertag r. Lallfont (1959), 9 Utah 2d 130, 339
P.2d 1022 this Court said:
"As with damages for injuries generally,
there is no method for exact calculation as to
punitive damages, nor is there any precise forinula for the relationship of punitive damages to
actual damages. The jury from its advantaged
position n1ust necessarily be allo\ved a broad
discretion in such Ina tters. It is true that this
court has stated a number of times that the
punitive damages n1ust bear some reasonable
relationship to actual da1uages. This is so becausp
they must not be so disproportionate as to n1anifest that they "\vere R\varded as a result of
passion or prejudice, or under misconception of,
or in disregard of the la"\v or the evidence. But
the relationship of the punitive damages to actual
damages a\varded is only one of the facts to be
considered in deterrnining whether the an1ount
awarded should be sustained."
In Fell v. lTnvon Pac. Ry. Co. (1907), 32 lTtah 101,
88 P. 1003, the Court, by way of dicta, calls attention
to the fact that there are cases where both interest and
exemplary damages are not allo\ved. The east- contain~
the follo\ving:
"General justice is never promoted by an
effort to reach it by ignoring sound principles
of la\v in particular cases. Whenever possible,
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it ought not be left to the mere caprice of either
court or jury to either grant or \vithhold that
which is due. A fixed rule, 'vhen based on sound
principles, is, in most instances, a safer guide
than the judgment of a few individuals, however
honest or pure their motives.''
The opinion as it is no\v \vritten deprives ~Ir.
~Ioreton of his property \vithout due process of law,
and in so doing usurps the function of the trier of
the fact in regard to punitive damage. The opinion as
no\v \Vritten is authority for the proposition that an
appellate court can make an R\vard of punitive damages
on a cause or a theory not presented to or passed upon
by the lo\Yer court.

In the case of }.;"orback c. Board of Directors of
Church Extension Society (1934), 84 "Ctah 514, 37 P.2d
339, it is stated:

HThat either party to an action at law has
the right to a trial by jur~~ when timely and
properly demanded is supported by the law' and
the decided cases."
The Supren1e Court of the l.,..nited States in the case
of Jacob r. City of ~.., eu' I . . ork. 315 l~.S. 732, 86 L.ed
1166, states:
'~The

right of jury trial in ciYil cases at
co1nn1on la\v is a basic and fundaJ.nental feature
of our systen1 of federal jurisprudence \Yhich is
protected by the Seventh An1en<hnent. A right so
fundrunental and sacred to the citizen, "'"hether
guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by
statute, should be jealously guarded by the
courts.''
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In Badon v. Suh/rnLann (1958), 8 Utah 2d 42, 327
P.2d 826, this Court held that an R\vard of $100.00 to
a twenty year old man \vho contracted a mild case of
trichinosis should be increased to $500.00 on condition
that if the defendant refused to accept the increase a
new trial would be ordered. The appeal was taken on
the grounds of inadequacy of the award. The dissenting
opinion forcibly attacks the additur and calls attention
to the fact that "To date the only relief in such cases
has been to grant a new trial." The dissenter goes further and points out that in permitting such procedure
and granting the relief asked for for the first time
on appeal this Court assumes the role of a trial court
and indulges a procedure that is a stranger to both
the trial court and the record.
"In 1ny opinion, this decision gives the court
a po\ver it never had and one that trespasses
into constitutional territory involving denial of
both a jury trial and due process. It lays down
what I think is a dangerous rule, that, even
\Vhere no one seeks the relief, we, who were not
particeps at the trial, can grant a new trial
unless defendant pays a sum we arbitrarily set,
forcing the plaintiff, who has absolutely no
choice in the matter, to take· the added amount
\vithout any possibility of having a jury pass
on the matter."
The opinion in the instant case does not involve an
additur but does "trespass into constitutional territory
involving denial of both a jury trial and due process''
to an extent far greater than is pointed out by the
dissenting opinion in the B odon case. In fact the instant
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opinion einasculates all concept of the right to a jury trial
and of due process. The judgment ordered to be corrected and the verdict ordered to be modified are upon
a theory not presently before the ·Court and not passed
upon at the level of the trial court. It is just as if
there had been no trial and the parties 'vere appearing
before this Court, asking for relief on the premise that
thi~ Court is of original and general jurisdiction.
POINT III.
'THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The opinion implies that the trial court vacated
the jury verdict and dismissed the Rex Holland action
upon the sole ground that the action 'vas not brought
'vithin three years after the discovery of the fraud.
While this Court says that the action of the trial court
'YaH "apparently upon the ground" of the statute of
limitations, the trial court did not expressly so state.
The motion contained several other grounds including
the contention that Rex Holland "-as not entitled to
prevail upon the theory of his action a~ subn1itted to
the jury, and on 'Yhieh ground this Court, by it~ opinion,
concurs.
The n1otion for a directed Yerdict made under Rule
50, [Jtah Ru,les of Civil Procedure, is found on pages
237 through 242 of the record. A further ground was
urged at page 958 of the record. The motion to set
aside the verdict and for a judgn1ent of disurissal found
at pag<-' ~S7 of the record adopts the grounds stated
both in 'vriting and orally on the 1notion for a directed
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verdict, and then calls specific attention to the fact
that ~·the evidence is insufficient in la'v to form a basis
for the verdict rendered and the sa1ne is against law... "
This Court is in accord "ith the latter state1nent in
holding· that Rex Holland cannot recover on the forfeiture theory.
The order and judgtnen t of the trial court ( R. 292294) setting aside the verdict of the jury and dis1nissing
the Rex Holland action does not delineate the grounds,
except as it incorporates the motion for a directed
verdict. The opinion of this Court therefore inaccurately suggests that the motion was granted by reason
of the trial court's concept of the statute of limitations
and does further injustice to the record by not pointing
out that there 'vere other grounds prompting the dismissal, including the proposition that the verdict \\ras
in error in awarding Rex Holland one-third of the entire
purchase price.
The opinion furthers the suggestion that the trial
court dismissed the action on the sole ground of the
statute of limitations
"We see no basis in the record to justify a
ruling by the trial court as a matter of law that
the plaintiffs had knowledge of fraud more than
three years before the action 'vas commenced.",
which expression is found in the same paragraph that
gives emphasis to the hearsay conversation with Canfield
and the self-serving statement that Canfield later "allayed'' Rex Holland's apprehension.
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Tlu~ Court makes no reference to nor does it at-

tempt to rationalize the Rex Holland letter to Dr.
l\1athesius of September 14, 1948, and the telegram
from ~1r. l\[oreton to Holland on October 8, 1948, in
concluding that the record was insufficient to justify
a ruling as a matter of la\Y that the plaintiffs had
knowledge of fraud more than three years before the
action was commenced. On the concept that this Court
will do no conscious \vrong, we cannot do other than
conclude that the omission of any reference to the
Rex Holland letter of September 14, 1948, and to ~Ir.
l\1oreton's telegram to Holland of October 8, 1948,
when making specific reference to the Canfield conversations, was an inadvertence. If the letter of September
14, 1948, and the telegran1 of October 8, 1948, had
been in the 1nind of the Court "hen "\vriting the opinion,
the Court \vould certainly not have said that there was
"no basis in the record to justify" a ruling by the trial
court as a n1atter of la\v that the plaintiffs had lmowledge of fraud n1ore than three years before the action
'vas commenced.
The ,\. .ashington Court In Re Sach"nzan·s Estate
(1949), 210 P.2d 682, reiterates the fan1iliar rule as
follo"~s:

'~In Noyes v. Parsons~ 104 '''ash. 594, 177
P. (i5l, G54 the court said, in part : 'The broad
assertion that thP statute does not run until the
fraud i8 diseovered is not tenable. The statute
begins to run when the fraud sho·uld hare been
dvscorercd, and a clue to the fact which ~¥ follo~rcd 11p diligently u·o~uld lead to discorerp ·is
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in law equivalent to discovery. Deering v. Holcomb, supra (26 Wash. 588, 67 P. 240, 561). A
general allegation of ignorance at one time and
knowledge at another is of no effect.' "
Instruction G requires a disclosure to Holland from
conversations 1vith ltf ore ton. In the same vein the
opinion ignores the rule just above stated and holds
that the statute does not run until the Hollands "knew
the facts." In the same paragraph the opinion implies
that the jury was instructed as to the statute of limitaions, which is not the fact.
The record does not justify the statement in the
opinion that "the running of the statute of limitations
of three years for actions in fraud is closely tied to
the jury's findings on the primary issue of whether a
fraud was perpetrated" and "the jury chose to believe
the plaintiffs' evidence which was to the effect that they
did not know the facts at the time of the transaction
and that the first knowledge they had of the true facts
was in October 1951.''
The letter of September 14, 1948, Exhibit P 14,
IS characterized in the concurring opinion in Holland
v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., supra, as follows:
"In this connection it is significant to remeinber that in Rex Holland's letter of September 14th he had said that Moreton misrepresented
the price at 10 cents per ton, whereas, Hollands
claimed it should have been 25 cents per ton.
Twenty-five cents per ton was the price actually
paid and the only evidence in the record is that
this was equal to the highest price 'Columbia paid
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for iron ore to anyone in the area. The simplest
mathematical calculation 'vould have sho"rn that
25 cents per ton x 1.55 million tons totals $387,500,
which calculation Rex Holland could easilv have
made, as is apparent fron1 the contents ·of the
Septe1nber 14th letter itself."
The telegra1n from ~I:r. :Jioreton to Rex Holland
under date of October 8, 19±8, the receipt "~hereof is
admitted by Rex Holland (R. 506), puts Holland squarely on notiee that l\f r. :Jioreton "~as bargaining for as
much as he could get for his vested one-fourth interest
in addition to the fixed amount for the Holland interests (R. 238, 505 and Respondents' Brief page 73).
The telegran1 of October 8, 1948, 'vas not before the
Court in Holland 1/. Columbia Iron ll!i-ning Co.~ supra,
and therefore does not con1e under the referenee to
that ease in considering the fartual baekgrotmd, to
"'"hich case the reader of the opinion in the instant ease
j~ referred for Hsuch further facts as are necessary to
the disposition of the issues presented on tllis appeal."
The telegran1, coupled "~ith R.ex Holland's letter to Dr.
1\fathesius of Septe1nber 1-t 19-±8. jn1putes lmn,vledge
to Rex Holland "~ithin the connotation of the opinion
that if the Hollands kneu· the facts the statute would
have eoininenced to run at that ti1ne. In any event, the
lettPr to Dr. l\lathesius and the telegran1 fro1n :J.Ir.
l\foreton cannot be expunged fro1n the record, or s'vept
under the rng ~o to speak, by the staten1ent:

•· ' r r

~re

no ba~is in the record to justify a ruling by the

trin l court as a 1uatter of la"~ that the plaintiffs had
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kno,vledge of fraud n1ore than three years before the
action \Vas c.onunenced.''
In addition to Rex Holland's letter to Dr. l\Ja thesius
and the telegran1 frorn I\[r. :1Ioreton there is Exhibit
P 19, a letter signed by Rex I--Iolland, hi~ rnother, father
and niurie under date of October 13, 19±8, addressed
to Colurnbia Iron ~fining Cornpany. The letter \vas introduced in evidence by Rex Holland (R. 388) and in
point of tin1e is one rnonth after the alleged conversation with ·Canfield on September 1-±, 1948, \Vhen Canfield is said to have stated that iron ore "Tas bringing
25¢ a ton \Yhic.h conversation prompted the letter to Dr.
:Jiathesius (R. 38:2). The letter of October 13, 19-±8, reads
in part:
"Accordingly \Ve entered into an Agreernent
\vith :Jir. 1Loreton for the patenting of said claims.
At the time the tonnage in said claims, and
n1ore particularly the prospect for sale, if any,
and the purchase price, if sale could be made
when such patent \Yas received, were uncertain
and speculative, as a result of which the return
to I\Ir. ~{oreton would necessarily be contingent.
Our Agreement with Mr. Moreton pro:vides
that in consideration of his assistance in holding
these claims and his patenting the same, at his
sole cost and expense, and other good and valuable considerations, which we have heretofore
received frorn him, that he shall receive for his
interest in said claims, all of the purchase price
which may be received for said claims in excess
of $100,000.00 (which amount was fixed by us),
the said sum of $100,000.00 to be received by
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us, as and for our full share of the purchase
price of said claims, and for all our interest in
said claims."
The above should be compared with Rex Holland's
own handwritten letter to Dr. ~1athesius on Septen1ber
14, 1948, Exhibit P 14, which states in part:
"Ever since the property has been diamond
drilled Mr. ~Ioreton has made us believe that there
was only One Million, Four Hundred Thousand
( 1,400,000) tons of iron ore contained in this
deposit.
\\"'" e agreed to accept $100,000.00 for this
property based upon that tonnage and have
signed Articles of Agreement that will expire at
the end of September, 1948. Sinee we signed the
Agreen1ent "\Ye have been advised that instead
of One ~Iillion, Four Hundred Thousand tons of
iron upon the property there are ·Three ~iillion
Five Hundred Thousand tons of iron ore and
that it is being offered for sale for .25c per
ton or a total sales price of $875~000.00.
Therefore 1\Ir. l\Ioreton has, through misleading us about the total tonnage, had us sign
an Agreement that "\vill net hin1 $773,000.00 for
a $700.00 investn1ent.
''Till you consider postponing the purchase of
the property until after R ove1nber 1st, 1948 and
notify 1\lr. l\Ioreton that the sale has been canceled·. This "~in then give tune for the Agreen1ent
bet\\·c~en us to expire.
e "~ill then den1and that
the sniP be~ 1nade on an equal basis***.~·

''T

The lettPr of October l~i~ l~l+S. \Yns not before the
Court in If olla nd r. C'ol nnl,biJa Iron Jl i·nin,o (Yo .• snpra (R.
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R 389) and has undoubtedly been overlooked by the Court
~!- in the instant action when it says:

,~

~'We

see no basis in the record to justify a
ruling by the trial court as a matter of law that
the plaintiffs had knowledge of fraud more than
three years before the action \Vas commenced."
The ·words of the opinion "\V e see no basis in the record
to justify" the ruling of the trial court on the statute
of lirnitations encon1pass the entire record \\i.thout qualification.
After the letter of September 14, 1948, to Dr. ~iathes
Ius there "Tas nothing done or said by Mr. Moreton
or by Columbia Iron Mining Company, or anyone else,
to dissuade Rex Holland from the suggestion that the
prevailing rate was 25¢ per ton, except Holland's own
self-serving statement as to his state of mind gleaned
from the hearsay conversation with Canfield (R. 384)
some two weeks after the first conversation (R. 382).
Canfield did not repudiate the price of 25¢ per ton, and
over objection, Holland was permitted to say that he concluded that there was no basis upon which to esti111ate
the tons of ore in the property and "if he (·Canfield)
\Vas not correct on the tons, then how could he be correct
on the price.'' (R. 384.)
"Q

(Rex Holland) Now, did you come to any
conclusion in your own mind, at that time,
or thereafter, with respect to the price of
25 cents~
MR. GUSTIN:

Now, we must object to that.
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TilE cor:nrr: The objection "~in be
stained on that.

SUS-

***

Q

(By 1Ir. Roberts) After your conversation
'vith l\Ir. Canfield, 'vhat 'vas your state of
mind with respect to the price of this ore y
l\fR. GliSTIX:
your Honor.

\Ve n1ust object to that,

THE

Objection overruled. (R.

COl'RT:

383).

***
A

Yes, I understand your question on that. At
that time he had quoted me a figure of
3,500,000 tons, 'vhich I thought he was referring only to the :J[ & H clain1s. And then
later on he tells me that he had not meant
it 'vas in the I\1: & H claims alone, but it
was in the con1plete ore body. So, I concluded that he had no basis at all on which
to base his estimated tons of ore in that
property, and, if he was not correct on the
tons, then ho"- r.ould he be correct on the
price.
THE C01TRT: No"r, I\Ir. Roberts, is that
all that you are going to ask in this connection'?
l\1R. R.OBERTS:

Yes. your Honor.

T11E COl~RT: :J[rs. Harbrecht, and gentlelnen of the jury. the purpose of adn1itting
this te~tin1onY at this tune is n1erelv to show
t hr state of ~nind of the plaintiff, !Ir. Holland, and you are not to assu1ne fron1 his
state1nents. as to the truth or correctness
of the a1nount of tonnage, etr. The only
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purpose of adrnitting this testirnony is to go
to ~fr. Holland's state of rnind in connection
\vith this conversation on this body of ore.

***
~IR.

ROBERTS: ~1r. Pollack has called my
attention to one question I didn't ask in
connection \vith the sarne rnatter, if I rnight
retract rny statement I was through, and
ask one more matter.

Tl1E COURT: As long as the jury understands this is merely to go to the state of
rnind, and not to the (R. 384) facts, as far
as the tonnage is concerned. I think those
have been established in the pre-trial, so
there is no question 1IR. POLLACK:

That is correct.

THE COURT: - as to the amount of the
tonnage and the price per ton.
i\IR. PO LLA:CI{: : That is correct.
~IR.

ROBERTS: ·The price has not been
established. It was just the quantity.
THE. COURT:
tion.

Q

Go ahead with your ques-

(By Mr. Roberts)

At this time, or after
this second conversation with Mr. Canfield,
what was the state of your mind as far as
Mr. Moreton was concerned, and what he had
told you concerning the price~
l\fR. GUSTIN: Now, your Honor, again, in
addition to the objection urged in ;Chambers,
we must add here that that reaches out into
the mind of another person, and it is incompetent in the conclusion.
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MR. ROBERTS: I certainly did not mean
to reach anybody else's mind.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled
subject to my previous statement to the jury:
~IR.

GUSTIK: :llf~y the reporter read it,
rather than repeat it.

A

I concluded then that Mr. Canfield had no
basislviR. ROBERTS: K o, no. My question goes
directly to the state of your mind as far as
lvlr. Moreton was concerned.

A

That 1\Ir. l\Ioreton had advised us correctly
as to the (R. 385) tonnage and the price of
the ore in the M & H claims." (R. 386)

\v-r e envision a petition for rehearing and the rule
"~j th respect thereto as a 1neans ".,.hereby the Court can
correct and rectify an inadvertence or error in its own
decision. Here \ve have three docmnents that haYe a
direct hearing on the statute of lin1itations and there is
no specific reference to the sa1ne in the opinion. True,
the letter to Dr. ~Iathesius is con11nented on in Holland
v. Colunzbia Irron 11/iniug c·a. and giYen special consideration in the eoneurring decision, \vhich decision 'ras
concurred in hy the " Titer of the opinion in the instant
aetion. Asstuning that it can be said that the letter to
Dr. l\~lathesius \YTitten bY
. Rex Holland 'yas not \vortln..
of eo1n1n0nt in deter1nining the propriety of the trial
court's ruling, can thf' other docu1nents be so treated?
The tel<.\ grain fro1n l\[ r. l\Ioreton is ne\\. to the case and
h~, it a reasonable 1nind is put on inquiry. It plays
7
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an in1portant part, not only on the issue of fraud but
on the running of the statute of limitations. It has been
inadvertently o1nitted in the ·Court's consideration of
the problen1.
Exhibit P 19, the letter signed by Rex Holland on
October 13, 1948, charges hin1 'vith kno,vledge of the
tonnage involved and reasserts his disclai1ner to any
dollar an1ount to be received by :Thir. ~foreton over and
above the sum of $100,000.00. This letter U'as introd1£ced
by the plaintiff hin~self) not on cross-exan1ination but
as a part of his case in chief.
Not to n1ention the letter or to rationalize the
san1e 'vith the contentions urged before the Court is
n1ost certainly an inadvertance and one that should
be rectified in order to maintain the integrity of the
record, and then, if the Court can say that it sees no
basis in the record to justify the ruling of the trial
court, the litigants cannot say, on that score, that matters
of consequence have been ignored or overlooked.
POINT IV.
THE OPINION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND TO THE
FACTS.

(a) The opinion recognizes Mr. Moreton's vested
interest in one-fourth of the purchase price. It flows
from the bargain for an undivided one-fourth of the
mining claims as subsequently patented, but the opinion
gives no effect to his option to purchase the remaining
three-fourths, a part of the same transaction. The in-
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consistency is compounded by a 1nisstatement of the
contractual arrange1nent, the opinion stating:

"It also recited that if the sale was 'slightly
in excess' of $133,000 ~Ioreton could have the
excess as compensation for his option to purchase
their interests.'' (En1phasis added.)
In connection '"ith a reconsideration of this case,
we feel obliged to say 'vith reference to the above 0\V!lership Agree1nent, that it did not so provide as quoted
above, but on the contrary, provided that nioreton 'vould
have all the excess over $100,000. The quotation above
was the testi1nony of Rex Holland in contradiction to
the expressed tern1s of the 'vritten agreement to 'vhich
testnnony tiinely objection "~as made. There is no linritation in the written agreement as to "~hat ~Ioreton should
receive over and above the specified smn of $100,000,
if sold on a tonnage basis as they indisputably "~ere
so sold.
We further feel obliged to call to the court's attention Holland's letter to ~I oreton of date Deeen1ber
15, 1951, (Ex. P-24, to be found on pages .A--±7~ A48
and A49 of our original brief). "rherein he stated, and
in ae<·ordance 'vith his oral testin1ony. H,,~e decided we
'YPrP ""illing to take the $100,000 and you should get
$60,000 * * * "Thirh 've 'vere led to believe was the
total a1nount reeeived fron1 that sale, 'rhich additional
a1nount \\7onld equal close to $75,000 no'v that the
tax<'~ havP been paid h~T you on that additional an1ount
$287,000. ~'
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It is not understandable ho\v the court could, or
would a\vard I-Iolland more than he clai1ned. It is further not understandable ho\V interest could be allo"red to
Holland on the amount of the total su1n R\varded hin1
when as a u1atter of la\v Holland \vould had to
have paid 5% state inco1ne tax and :23% federal inco1ne
tax by April 1, 19-±9. It is clearly 1nanifest that this
court's decision a\varded to Holland 1nore than he hilnself claimed.
The portion of the op1n1on quoted above, \vhile
a1nbiguous, departs fron1 the true co1nmitment to the
effect that the patenting of the clain1s \\Tas the consideration for the acquisition of the one-fourth interest
and for the option to acquire the remaining three-fourths
interest. All of the \Yritings are to that effect and
there is no effort made in the instant case to set any
of then1 aside (R. 626 and 665). The option is an
integral part of the contract vesting the one-fourth
interest and cannot be treated separately or ignored.
This is the holding of this Court in Moody v. Sn1ith
(1959), 9 1Jtah 2d 139, 340 P. 2d 83, \Vhere the Court
states:
"Plaintiff's attack is directed against the
existence of the option clause, and this allegedly
challenges the creation of a contract. Inspection
does not support such a conclusion; the option
is an integral part of a larger eontract, the lease.
This encompassing lease was admittedly a valid
and binding agreement and \vould unquestionably
be altered and varied should any change be made
in the meaning or effect of the option."
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(b) The opinion as presently \Yritten is on the
theory of plaintiff's Second Cause of Action \vhich he
elected to forego in the interest of his misconceived
First Cause of Action \vhere he looked to recover on
the extrernely punitive theory of forfeiture. The casual
reader of the opinion would not be R\vare of the election
as between the First and Second Causes of Action.
What the 'Court has done cannot be said to be a mere
coincidence as bet\veen the two causes or to be reconciled b~~ the language that the verdict '~should be nlodified'' and the remanding of the case "for correction
of the judgment." l~nder the guise of "correction" and
of "1nodification" the Court has substituted the Second
Cause of Action contrary to the la-\\~ of the case, has
deprived _jir. ~foreton of a trial by jury on issues not
presented at the trial level, including the issue of punitive dan1ages. Property is taken 'vithout due process
of la \Y·. The opinion departs fron1 the record made in
the court belo"~ in violation of constitutional provisions
and of the statutes and rules pro1nulgated thereunder.
(c) The direction of a ne\v and rensed judg1nent
in this action prevents ~Ir. l\Ioreton fron1 testing in
any 1nanner \Yhatsoever the legality of the san1e tmder
previous}~¥ accepted and recognized standards laid dow~
by the constitution and la\Ys of this State~ including
the decisions of this Court. ..A.Jnong other things~ Jlr.
Moreton is

dc~priYed

of a direct attack upon Instruction

No. 6A (R. 268), \Yhich is clearly erroneous as to the
eonePpt of punitive damage, the hearsay and self-serving
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Canfield-Rex Holland purported conversation, the method used by appellants to get before the jury as a fact
the so-called "confidence restored'' aspect of the Canfield conversation which this Court says "allayed"
Holland's apprehensions, and that such \Vas admissable
as a state of mind. Those matters, including the approach
that is reasonably available on the theory of contract
and 1nany other matters, are swept aside by the opinion
as it is no'v 'vritten, resulting in a deprivation of rights
of a litigant under the concept of due process.
(d) The dissenting opinion points out in no uncertain terms the basic fallacy of the 1najority holding.
\Vhen able jurists disagree as to \vhether "'fraud" has
or has not been disclosed by the record, it strengthens
the contention that fraud is not sho"rn by clear and
convincing evidence. The criticis1n leveled at the Inajority opinion by the dissenter, coupled with the inconsistencies and the procedural difficulties pointed
out above and the treatment of the punitive da1nages,
should, we respectfully suggest, be sufficient to cause the
Court to again revie'v the entire record in order that
no injustice be done.
The petition for rehearing should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CHRISTENSEN
HARLEY W. GUSTIN
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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